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A “SLAPP” IN THE FACE OF FREE SPEECH:
PROTECTING SURVIVORS’ RIGHTS TO SPEAK UP IN
THE “ME TOO” ERA
Alyssa R. Leader ∗
INTRODUCTION
Kristen Vander-Plas was a second-year law student at
Texas Tech University when she encountered the legal system in
a way that most students never anticipate: she was named by
local politician, Donald May, as the defendant in a defamation
suit. 1 For Kristen, this was only the latest in a long line of
unwanted encounters with May. 2 May sexually assaulted
Kristen on multiple occasions a few years prior to the defamation
claim. 3 When Kristen became a law student at Texas Tech, he
showed up repeatedly outside of her classrooms and in spaces
Kristen frequented. 4 Fearing for her safety, Kristen reported
May’s behavior, including the prior assaults, to administrators of
Texas Tech. 5 Ultimately, the university reached out to May to
request that he refrain from coming to the law school campus. 6
In response to the university’s request, May filed a
defamation suit against Kristen, claiming that her allegations
had negatively impacted him personally and professionally. 7 The
suit dragged on through the end of Kristen’s third year of law
school and continued to impact her life in major ways. 8 She
studied for and took the bar exam not knowing whether or not
May’s suit would prevent her from being accepted by the Texas

∗

J.D. Candidate, Class of 2020, University of North Carolina School of Law; Staff
Member, First Amendment Law Review Vol. 17; Editor-in-Chief, First Amendment
Law Review Vol. 18. I would like to extend special thanks to End Rape on Campus,
where I served as a Legal Fellow in the Summer of 2018, for lending their resources
and support to my early research of anti-SLAPP law. I am grateful to my friends and
family for their patient, fervent support of my work. Finally, I extend my warmest
gratitude to my dear friend Kristen Vander-Plas for lending me her story, her
strength, and her mentorship.
1
Vander-Plas v. May, No. 07-15-00454-CV, 2016 WL 5851913, at *1 (Tex. App.
Oct. 4, 2016), reh’g denied (Nov. 14, 2016), and review denied (Feb. 24, 2017).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.; Republican Ducks Texas Politician’s Libel Suit, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Oct. 17,
2016), https://www.courthousenews.com/republican-ducks-texas-politicians-libelsuit/.
8
E-mail from Kristin Vander-Plas to author (Jan 6, 2019, 04:01 CST) (on file with
author).
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Bar. 9 Eventually, right before she received her bar exam results,
Kristen heard another piece of news that brought her relief. 10 The
Texas Appeals Court in Amarillo dismissed the claim against her
and awarded her attorneys’ fees, citing a state statute protecting
individuals speaking out about matters of public interest from
frivolous litigation.
Retaliatory defamation lawsuits against people speaking
up about sexual violence are not unusual. 11 In the age of “Me
Too,” survivors 12 have been emboldened to come forward and
speak up about experiences with sexual violence and
harassment. 13 Unfortunately, their speech can come with the cost
of litigation initiated by those they have accused. 14 Some, like
Kristen, are lucky; their states have protective statutes that allow
survivors to respond to frivolous defamation claims with a
special motion that allows them to be dismissed quickly and
easily. 15 However, many jurisdictions lack these statutes or their

9

Id.
Id.
11
This Note specifically refers to civil defamation suits, including claims of libel and
slander. There are a minority of states which maintain rarely-used criminal
defamation statutes. The Supreme Court has discouraged such statutes, and their
constitutionality has been called into question. This Note does not address the
question of remedies for claims and questions under these criminal statutes. For
more on criminal libel, see generally Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The
Ignominy of Criminal Libel in American Jurisprudence, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 433 (2004).
12
This Note uses the term “survivors” to refer to individuals who report having
experienced sexual assault or harassment. The use of this term is not intended to
reflect a formal determination of guilt or innocence of the accused party; rather, it is
intended to reflect language those who have reported sexual violence are likely to use
to describe themselves. See Alexandra Brodsky, “Rape-Adjacent": Imagining Legal
Responses to Nonconsensual Condom Removal, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 183, 184 n.3
(2017).
13
The “Me Too” movement (further described infra Part I.B.) is a social movement
that began in 2017, largely online and in popular culture. The goal of the movement
is to bring awareness to women’s experiences of sexual assault and harassment by
encouraging those who have experienced sexual violence to speak up and say, “Me,
too.” The movement has been wildly successful with young women and is largely
considered to have ushered in an age of awareness and openness about sexual
violence in American culture. Tarana Burke, History and Vision, ME TOO,
https://metoomvmt.org/about/ (last visited May. 7, 2019).
14
See Hazel Cills, Students Accused of Misconduct Are Increasingly Filing Defamation Suits
Against Their Accusers, JEZEBEL (Dec. 5, 2017, 5:15 PM),
https://jezebel.com/students-accused-of-sexual-misconduct-are-increasingly1821026491.
15
Defamation is a broad term used to describe claims of both libel and slander and
other similarly damaging false claims. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 4101 (West 2018) (defining
a defamation claim as “any action or other proceeding for defamation, libel, slander,
or similar claim alleging that forms of speech are false, have caused damage to
reputation or emotional distress, have presented any person in a false light, or have
resulted in criticism, dishonor, or condemnation of any person”); see Vander-Plas v.
May, No. 07-15-00454-CV, 2016 WL 5851913, at *3 (Tex. App. Oct. 4, 2016).
10
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statutes lack the specificity necessary to best serve survivors of
violence. 16
This Note explores the current state of protections for
those speaking about sexual violence and recommends
improvements to ensure that survivors’ First Amendment right
of free speech is protected. In Part I, this Note explores the scope
of the problem by drawing on media interviews with survivors
who have experienced frivolous defamation claims, stories
shared on social media, and resolved cases. 17 These stories
illustrate that fear of legal action is chilling to survivors who may
come forward with their experiences of sexual violence. Part I
further discusses the potential far-reaching consequences if
survivors remain afraid of facing frivolous lawsuits for speaking
up, including chilling free expression and fostering less safe
work, home, and public environments for women and vulnerable
individuals. 18 Next, Part II explores the state of current antiSLAPP law. 19 It describes the variations of anti-SLAPP statutes
by jurisdiction and divides states’ laws into three categories based
on the protections they provide. Part III discusses how these
differing protections may serve or fail survivors who are sued for
speaking up. 20 Part IV discusses how applicability of some antiSLAPP statutes may shift in the “Me Too” era. 21 Finally, Part V
makes recommendations for protecting survivors’ rights to speak
up about sexual violence going forward. 22 These
recommendations include improving existing anti-SLAPP
statutes to ensure they protect survivors’ free speech rights and
creating additional anti-SLAPP statutes. 23
I. THE PROBLEM
Some context is important to show how SLAPPs impact
survivors of sexual assault. First, the pervasiveness of sexual
assault and harassment make this an ever-present issue for
survivors. Second, the rise of the “Me Too” movement is a
response to the overwhelming amount of often hidden sexual
abuse. Third, experiences abound of those who, like Kristen
Vander-Plas, faced SLAPP suits after speaking out about sexual
violence. Finally, important First Amendment values are at stake
16

See infra Part II.
See infra Part I
18
See infra Part I.
19
SLAPPs are Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. See infra Part II.
20
See infra Part III.
21
See infra Part IV.
22
See infra Part V.
23
See infra Part V.
17
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in ensuring that survivors maintain their rights to free speech in
the “Me Too” era.
The Scope of Sexual Assault and Harassment
Sexual violence and sexual harassment are pervasive
problems. 24 An estimated one in five women and one in seventyone men experience rape. 25 Prevalence of non-penetrative sexual
assault is even higher, with nearly one in three women and one
in ten men reporting experiencing unwanted sexual contact. 26
Half of all transgender and gender-expansive 27 individuals
experience sexual violence in their lifetimes. 28 At least one-fourth
of women experience sexual harassment in the workplace. 29
Despite the prevalence of these experiences, only about twenty
percent of experiences of sexual violence are formally reported. 30
Victims of sexual violence cite a variety of reasons for not
reporting including fear of retaliation, a belief that an assault was
not serious enough to warrant reporting, or concern that law
enforcement could not or would not help. 31

24

See generally BLACK ET AL., THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL
VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT (2011),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf.
25
Id. at 18.
26
Id. at 19. Estimates of experiences of rape and sexual violence among men and
boys vary widely. This number, from the Department of Justice, is among the more
conservative estimates. Other estimates place numbers of male victimization for
general sexual abuse of men as high as one in six. Id. But see Shanta R. Dube et al. &
R.F Whitfield, Long-term Consequences of Childhood Sexual Abuse by Gender of Victim, 28
AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 430, 433 (2005).
27
Gender-expansive is a term used throughout this paper to capture the full range of
gender expressions and identities. See Resources on Gender Expansive Children and
Youth, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/resources-on-genderexpansive-children-and-youth (last visited May 7, 2019).
28
SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANS EQUALITY, THE REPORT
OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 198 (2016),
https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-ReportFINAL.PDF.
29
CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
REPORT OF THE SELECT TASKFORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE 8 (2016), https://perma.cc/2K3M-MMRL.
30
RACHEL E. MORGAN & GRACE KENA, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 2016: REVISED 7 (2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv16re.pdf; see also BLACK ET AL., supra note
24.
31
MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 1994–2010 7 (2016),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf; see also The Criminal Justice
System: Statistics, RAPE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK,
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system (last visited May 7, 2019).
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The “Me Too” Movement
“If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me
too’ as a reply to this tweet.” 32 In the fall of 2017, this was the
tweet heard and shared around the world. The request, based off
a movement founded by anti-sexual violence activist Tarana
Burke, caught fire when shared by actress and activist Alyssa
Milano. 33 Milano’s tweet came in the wake of the discovery that
Harvey Weinstein and other powerful Hollywood men had
sexually harassed and abused women across the entertainment
industry for many years. 34 The massive response to the tweet
revealed to the world what many women already knew: This was
not just a Hollywood problem. 35 Thousands of women stated,
“Me too,” on their own social media pages, shocking male
friends and family members who had previously failed to grasp
the extent to which women suffered from harassment. 36 Women
and gender-expansive folks had been organizing around sexual
violence for years, and this moment energized, centralized, and
brought attention to their work. 37 The “Me Too” movement, as
it came to be called, took off fiercely and quickly. Survivors
began implicating, naming, and shaming abusers from a variety
of backgrounds. 38 Sexual harassers in the public eye were ousted
from power and faced social consequences. 39
32

Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 1:21 PM),
https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/status/919659438700670976. Milano’s original
“Me Too” tweet was directly retweeted (or shared) 23,579 times and favorited
52,010 times as of April 28, 2019. Id. A “tweet” is a written communication shared
on a popular social media website called Twitter. Twitter allows users to share brief
thoughts—280 characters or less—with their followers. Users can endorse one
another’s tweets by favoriting the tweet or retweeting to share with their own
followers. TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/en_us.html (last visited May 7,
2019).
33
See Najja Parker, Who Is Tarana Burke? Meet the Woman Who Started the Me Too
Movement a Decade Ago, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.ajc.com/news/world/who-tarana-burke-meet-the-woman-whostarted-the-too-movement-decade-ago/i8NEiuFHKaIvBh9ucukidK/; Milano, supra
note 32.
34
See Elias Leight, Harvey Weinstein Sexual Assault Allegations: A Timeline, ROLLING
STONE (May 25, 2018, 5:43 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culturenews/harvey-weinstein-sexual-assault-allegations-a-timeline-628273/.
35
See Chicago Tribune Staff & K.T. Hawbaker, #MeToo: A Timeline of Events, CHI.
TRIB. (Jan. 23, 2019, 3:05 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-metoo-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html.
36
See id.
37
See id.
38
See Chicago Tribune Staff & Hawbaker, supra note 35.
39
See id. Consequences for men who have been named as abusers have been wideranging. Some—movie mogul Harvey Weinstein, music artist R. Kelly, and doctor
Larry Nassar—have been charged with crimes related to their alleged sexual assault.
Others—comedian Louis. C.K. and actor Kevin Spacey—have seen their shows and
appearances cancelled. Many—news anchor Matt Lauer, film director Bryan Singer,
and music director James Levine—were fired. Unfortunately, some—President
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Of course, significant backlash met the rise of this
movement. 40 Critics, primarily men, expressed concern that the
movement had gone “too far” in its attempt to hold harassers
and abusers accountable. 41 An often-voiced concern was that
sexual violence allegations could irreparably damage careers. 42
Others voiced concerns that the movement failed to distinguish
between what they described as “low-level” offenses (such as
lewd comments) and “serious” misconduct (such as serial rape),
instead painting everyone named as a harasser as an
irredeemable villain. 43 Some expressed concern that the
movement could disrupt the standards of behavior between men
and women and place men in a position where they would be
afraid of saying or doing something inadvertently offensive. 44 An
overarching theme was concern about the defamation of
potentially faultless people and assertions about their right to
have their innocence presumed. 45 Concerns about reputations
and false accusations have begun to play out in litigation seeking
to stem the tide of reports.
SLAPP Suits and the Silencing of Survivors
Even prior to the start of the “Me Too” movement, civil
litigation was used as a tool to silence individuals who spoke up
about sexual violence. 46 Defamation actions can be important
Donald Trump, Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh—have seen few concrete
consequences.
40
See Andrew Sullivan, It’s Time to Resist the Excesses of #MeToo, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 12,
2018), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/01/andrew-sullivan-time-toresist-excesses-of-metoo.html.
41
See id.
42
See id.
43
See Kathryn Casteel & Andrea Jones-Rooy, We Need a Better Way to Talk About
Sexual Misconduct, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 17, 2018, 6:01 AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/we-need-a-better-way-to-talk-about-sexualmisconduct/.
44
See Jenna Amatulli, Henry Cavill’s Me Too Comments Spark Strong Reactions on
Twitter, HUFFINGTON POST (July 12, 2018, 10:06 AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/henry-cavills-me-too-comments-sparkcontroversy-on-twitter_us_5b475159e4b022fdcc56a47a.
45
See, e.g., Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 10, 2018, 7:33
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/962348831789797381. Of
course, the right to presumed innocence is granted by the Constitution to protect
defendants from the presumption of guilt in a criminal trial. The Constitution does
not grant individuals the right to be believed innocent of any misconduct by family,
friends, or their society at large without a criminal conviction. See Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453–54 (1895); see generally Terese L. Fitzpatrick, Innocent Until
Proven Guilty: Shallow Words for the Falsely Accused in A Criminal Prosecution for Child
Sexual Abuse, 12 UNIV. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 175 (1991).
46
Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Courts:
Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55, 58 n.10 (2006)
(citing the common problem of individuals sued for assault filing counterclaims for
defamation).
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tools in protecting the reputations of individuals, organizations,
and businesses. 47 However, these sorts of claims can threaten free
speech when used in bad faith. Such suits are often referred to as
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation or “SLAPPs.” 48
Put simply, a SLAPP is filed with the intention of
stopping someone from exercising his or her right to speak. 49
These suits are generally filed without regard for whether the
litigation will be successful. 50 Instead, they seek to silence speech
through the inconvenience and cost of litigation. 51 These suits
also have a chilling effect by preventing others from making
similar statements in the future for fear of facing a lawsuit. 52 In
interviews given to Buzzfeed, both victims’ rights advocates and
defense attorneys noted that their own experiences serving
clients reflect an uptick in these claims being filed against
individuals expressing that they have experienced sexual
violence. 53 Public discourse also reflects an uptick in concern
about defamation suits related to assault or harassment, with
people taking to social media and other online platforms to offer
one another support around defamation claims. 54
47

For example, the families of children murdered in a mass shooting filed a
defamation suit against Alex Jones. The shooting took place on December 14, 2012
at Sandy Hook Elementary School. The gunman killed twenty children (between the
ages of five and ten years old) and six educators. In the wake of the shooting Jones,
an extremist commentator and well-known conspiracy theorist, repeatedly stated that
the shooting had been staged and that the families of the victims were paid actors.
See James Barron, Nation Reels After Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in
Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/nyregion/shooting-reported-at-connecticutelementary-school.html; Elizabeth Williamson, Judge Rules Against Infowars and Alex
Jones in Sandy Hook Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/us/politics/alex-jones-infowars-sandyhook-lawsuit.html.
48
This term was coined by George Pring, professor at University of Denver College
of Law. When he coined the term, SLAPP suits were generally only those
defamation suits which targeted individuals seeking to petition the government; now,
SLAPP suits are understood to target more broad speech on matters of public
interest, including allegations of sexual violence or harassment. George W. Pring &
Penelope Canan, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs): An
Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 UNIV. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 962
(1992) at 937–38; Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence SLAPPS, PUB. PARTICIPATION
PROJECT, https://anti-slapp.org/slapps-against-sexual-assault-and-domesticviolence-survivors/ (last visited May 7, 2019).
49
Pring & Canan, supra note 48, at 937–38.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Tyler Kingkade, As More College Students Are Saying “Me Too,” Accused Men Are
Suing for Defamation, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 5, 2017, 11:26 AM),
https://web.archive.org/web/20180725013746/https://www.buzzfeednews.com/a
rticle/tylerkingkade/as-more-college-students-say-me-too-accused-men-are-suing.
54
Alisha Grauso (@alishagrauso), TWITTER (June 18, 2018, 6:49 PM),
https://twitter.com/AlishaGrauso/status/1008889359909548032; TIME’S UP
DEFENSE FUND, https://www.timesupnow.com/ (last visited May 7, 2019); Bruce
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For survivors of sexual violence, SLAPPs can be
especially chilling. 55 For most SLAPP defendants, defending
against a defamation suit is finically burdensome and time
consuming. 56 While the costs of defending a defamation suit for
an individual can vary depending on the circumstance, they are
likely the same as other types of civil claims, ranging from
$43,000 (for an automobile claim) to $91,000 (for a contract
claim). 57 Coupled with the reality that lower-income individuals
typically face higher rates of sexual violence, the financial
burdens of defending against a SLAPP are particularly
threatening for survivors. 58
Furthermore, survivors of sexual violence may face a
greater emotional and mental health burden than other SLAPP
defendants. 59 Defending against a defamation suit may require
frequent retelling of the assault or harassment and the frequent
reliving of any associated trauma. 60 If victims’ personal
information, details of the violence, or their response to it is
revealed through the discovery process, they may face
embarrassment or shame. 61 Survivors are likely to face stress and
trauma from the continued interaction with an abuser required
by the process of litigation. 62
One woman, “Jane,” reported to the student conduct
office at Washington University at St. Louis that her ex-husband
Johnson, Worried About Getting Sued for Reporting Sexual Abuse? Here Are Some Tips,
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 22, 2018, 4:00 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/worried-about-getting-sued-reportingsexual-abuse-here-are-some-tips.
55
Kingkade, supra note 53.
56
Id.
57
The costs of defending defamation claims against large entities such as media
outlets may range from between one million to seven million dollars. Lee
Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind the Cart, 35
AM. U. L. REV. 3, 27 (1985); PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE WATERS,
ESTIMATING THE COST OF CIVIL LITIGATION, 20 CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS: NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 1, 7 (2013) (describing the costs of civil litigation more
generally).
58
MORGAN & KENA, supra note 30, at 8.
59
Kingkade, supra note 53 (explaining the emotional and mental health difficulties
faced by some survivors who are SLAPP-ed).
60
See generally Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 103 (1977) (describing in depth the trauma women
face when addressing sexual violence in the legal system).
61
Id.
62
See e.g., Amanda Arnold, 3 Women on What It Was Like to Testify at Their SexualAssault Hearings, THE CUT (Sept 26, 2018) https://www.thecut.com/2018/09/3women-on-testifying-at-their-sexual-assault-hearings.html (describing the trauma and
pain experienced by a woman who testified in a criminal trial twice after one trial
ended in a hung jury, who said “[i]f I’m assaulted a second time, I don’t think I’ll be
believed. That’s what I get hung up on. I think I’m actually less safe than I was
before I stood up for myself. And less confident in the power of my voice. If a friend
were raped and asked me whether she should testify, I’d tell her: don’t do it”).
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had raped her. After being found responsible by the conduct
board, Jane’s ex-husband sued her for defamation. 63 The cost of
defending herself against this claim was twice her monthly
income, reaching $20,000 even in the early stages of the
lawsuit. 64 The suit also had an emotional impact on Jane, who
lamented, “I thought I was done suffering at the hand of this
person. I thought he was done making my life miserable. All of
a sudden I’m being sued.” 65
Recent high-profile cases reflect a similar story. Musical
artist, Taylor Swift, was unsuccessfully sued for defamation by a
man whom she accused of touching her inappropriately during a
meet and greet. 66 In her testimony at the jury trial, she expressed
a sentiment common among SLAPP-ed survivors. When asked
about damage to the plaintiff’s reputation, Taylor stated “I am
being blamed for the unfortunate events of his life that are a
product of his decisions and not mine.”67
First Amendment Rights At Stake
This use of the legal system to silence survivors negatively
impacts survivors and may have negative impacts for society at
large. Generally, SLAPPs threaten citizens’ First Amendment
rights to free speech and to petition the government, which are
“principal pillar[s] of a free government.” 68 Today, freedom of
expression is more than a principal of a free government—it is a
promise of American society that has taken on a nearly
legendary quality. What was instituted initially as a tool to
prevent political tyranny is seen today as the sacred birthright of
all citizens. 69
As the “Me Too” movement has demonstrated, free
speech at its best can point out wrongs, demand accountability,

63

Kingkade, supra note 53.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Mueller v. Swift, No. 15-CV-1974-WJM-KLM, 2017 WL 2362137 (D. Colo. May
31, 2017). Swift countersued for assault seeking damages of $1. Ultimately the
defamation claim was dismissed with respect to Swift (but not other defendants). At
jury trial, the jury ruled for Swift, who was awarded the $1 in damages she sought for
her assault on a counter-claim.
67
Constance Grady, Taylor Swift Won Her Day in Court: Here’s What You Need to Know.
VOX NEWS (Aug. 15, 2017, 9:30 AM),
https://www.vox.com/culture/2017/8/11/16127214/taylor-swift-groping-trialexplained.
68
Pring & Canan, supra note 48, at 942–43; U.S. CONST. amend. I.; BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN, On Freedom of Speech and the Press (Nov. 17, 1737), reprinted in THE WORKS
OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 2, 285–310 (Jared Sparks ed., 1882).
69
Stephen Rohde, Presidential Power Free Press, L.A. LAW 26, 28 (October 2017)
(explaining the initial intent of the First Amendment to protect citizens from
government tyranny).
64

450

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

and encourage change. 70 Speech holds the power to teach and
share. However, due to historic oppression and limitations on
the speech of women and people of color, the speech of those
most vulnerable to social oppression has often gone unheard. 71
The impact has been that social norms, policies, and attitudes
which contribute to oppression have thrived, unchallenged. 72
While the tides of free expression appear to be turning towards
more freedom for all, these deeply engrained historic and social
dynamics mean that speech of those at the margins is still
vulnerable to being chilled or silenced completely. 73
In discussing sexual violence, the rights of speech and
petition are especially important. Speaking out about sexual
violence can have the practical effect of holding perpetrators
accountable for their actions within their social, personal, and
professional circles. 74 Over time, this level of accountability may
have a deterrent effect on individuals who would otherwise
engage in violence and harassment. 75 For example, sharing
information about predatory individuals through “whisper
networks” is a method that non-male individuals have
historically used to protect one another from known abusers and
harassers. 76
Free expression is an important tool that, when wielded
effectively by survivors, can have the impact of shifting social
attitudes and dynamics around sexual violence. The silencing of
survivors and victims through SLAPP suits threatens to turn
back the hard-won progress oppressed people have made in
exercising their right to free expression. Silencing survivors
speaking up threatens the safety of those who may be harassed
and the ability of society to hold harassers accountable. It
threatens the free speech rights of those most vulnerable.
II. THE STATE OF ANTI-SLAPP LAW
A survivor who exercises their First Amendment right
and speaks up truthfully about their experience of sexual assault
70

See Chicago Tribune Staff & Hawbaker, supra note 35.
Mary Anne Franks, Beyond 'Free Speech for the White Man': Feminism and the First
Amendment, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 366, 366–370
(Robin West & Cynthia Bowman eds., 2019).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 384.
74
See Chicago Tribune Staff & Hawbaker, supra note 35.
75
Id.
76
One such whisper network was contained in an online spreadsheet entitled
“SHITTY MEDIA MEN” and was distributed among individuals who regularly
work with members of the media. Alex Press, It’s Time to Weaponize the Whisper
Network, VOX NEWS (Oct. 17, 2017, 10:02 AM), https://www.vox.com/firstperson/2017/10/16/16482800/harvey-weinstein-sexual-harassment-workplace.
71
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has done nothing legally wrong. It may come as a shock to many,
then, to suddenly find themselves a defendant in a legal action.
Often, a survivor’s immediate concern might be how to make the
legal action go away as quickly as possible. If the survivor is
fortunate enough to live in a jurisdiction with strong AntiSLAPP protections, they may have an opportunity to see the
case dismissed.
Anti-SLAPP statutes are laws that provide a special
protection for individuals facing SLAPPs. 77 These statutes allow
defendants—for our purposes, sexual assault survivors—in
potential SLAPP actions to file a special motion to dismiss in
response to the complaint. 78 The purpose of such a motion is to
provide the defendant an opportunity to have a nuisance suit
dismissed quickly and easily prior to the discovery phase, saving
them significant time, expense, and emotional energy. 79 When
defendants file a traditional motion to dismiss a suit filed against
them, the defendant is responsible for demonstrating that the suit
is without merit. 80 However, if a defendant prevails on an antiSLAPP motion, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must then
prove that their case has merit to avoid dismissal. 81 Furthermore,
many anti-SLAPP laws also include provisions requiring the
plaintiff to pay costs and attorneys’ fees to the person they sued
when an anti-SLAPP motion is successful. 82 Unfortunately, only
thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have anti-SLAPP
statutes, and anti-SLAPP laws vary significantly by
jurisdiction.83 There is no federal anti-SLAPP statute, though in

77
Michael C. Denison, SLAPP Happy Courts Continued to Refine the Reach of the AntiSLAPP Law in Numerous Decisions in 2010, L.A. LAW. 21, 21–22 (June 2011).
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
See e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
States which do not have anti-SLAPP statutes or case law establishing an antiSLAPP motion include Alabama, Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. State Anti-SLAPP
Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speechprotection/ (last visited May 7, 2019). Both Colorado and West Virginia have
established a special anti-SLAPP motion in case law, but it has not been recorded as
a statute. See generally Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549, 551 (1993) (establishing antiSLAPP protections in West Virginia for speech related to petitioning activities such
as testifying before the government, seeking redress from courts, requesting services
from administrative bodies); Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. Dist. Court in & for
Jefferson Cty., 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984) (establishing anti-SLAPP protections in
Colorado for speech related to petitioning activities such as testifying before the
government, seeking redress from courts, requesting services from administrative
bodies).
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the past, courts have generally held that state anti-SLAPP
statutes can be applied in diversity cases applying state law. 84
In analyzing an anti-SLAPP motion, the court considers
(a) whether the speech in question is protected under the statute
and (b) if the speech is protected, whether the plaintiff can make
a showing that they have a probability of prevailing on a
defamation claim. 85 If the defendant can demonstrate that their
speech was protected under the statute, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to prove they have a probability of prevailing on their
claim in order to prevent the claim from being dismissed as a
SLAPP suit. 86
Protected Speech
The types of speech protected under anti-SLAPP statutes
vary widely by state but can generally be delineated into three
categories: Formal Petition Protections, Political Participant
Protections, and Broad Anti-SLAPP Protections. 87
First, some anti-SLAPP statutes, Formal Petition
Protections, protect speech made only as part of “petitioning the
government” and only when made before an official government
body. 88 Anti-SLAPP statutes that are protections for formal
petitions seek to protect First Amendment rights to petition
without disturbing individual rights to seek damages for
defamatory statements. 89 For instance, Hawaii’s anti-SLAPP
statute limits application to “lawsuit[s] . . . that [are] solely based
84

See generally Katelyn E. Saner, Getting SLAPP-ED in Federal Court: Applying StateAnti-SLAPP Special Motions To Dismiss in Federal Court After Shady Grove, 63 DUKE
L.J. 781 (2013). Recently, there has been a departure from the general acceptance of
applying state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court. The D.C. Circuit has held that
D.C.’s anti-SLAPP law conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and thus
cannot be applied in diversity cases. See Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., 783 F.3d 1328
(D.C. Cir. 2015). The 9th Circuit has held that the broad idea that state anti-SLAPP
statutes ought to be applied in all federal cases is incorrect; instead, such statutes
should only be applied when they attack the legal—rather than the factual—
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ctr.
for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 2018). For now, whether courts will
continue to apply state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal cases remains a somewhat
open question. See generally Saner, supra note 84.
85
Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2010). Which speech is
covered as well as the burden the plaintiff must meet to make their case also varies by
jurisdiction. State Anti-SLAPP Laws, supra note 83.
86
Id.
87
To my knowledge, no other authors have similarly categorized Anti-SLAPP
statutes.
88
States in this category include: Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634F-1 (West
2019)), Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.528 (West 2019)), New Mexico (N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1 (West 2019)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1443.1
(West 2019)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-1003 (West 2019)), and
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.510 (West 2019)). See also State AntiSLAPP Laws, supra note 83.
89
Id.
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on the party’s public participation before a governmental
body.” 90 Under this and similar statutes, statements such as those
made in a legislative hearing, formal statements made to
encourage a change in laws or law enforcement, or statements
requesting government action are protected as long as they are
made and submitted through formal channels, like a petition or
testimony. 91 For example, in Cordova, the Supreme Court of New
Mexico found that statements made in the course of participation
in a formal recall petition against a school board representative
were protected under the anti-SLAPP law. 92
The second category of statutes, Political Participant
Protections, provide protections for people who speak in any
forum as long as the speech touches on specific public interest
issues, generally those under consideration by a government
body. 93 Utah’s statute protects speech made in any forum by
broadly protecting “participat[ion] in the process of government”
rather than speech made before a government body. 94 This
statute and others like it protect statements made on social
media, at public gatherings, or in other public spaces as long as
the comments pertain to a matter currently under consideration
by a government body. 95 Such statutes seek to protect the rights
90

HAW. REV. STAT. § 634F-1 (2018).
See e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634F-1 (West 2019); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.528
(West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1 (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1443.1 (West 2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-1003 (West 2019); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.24.510 (West 2019); State Anti-SLAPP Laws, supra note 83.
92
Interestingly, in this case, the court upheld that plaintiff’s right to petition was
protected under the anti-SLAPP statute even though the petition itself was largely
baseless. Cordova v. Cline, 396 P.3d 159, 161 (N.M. 2017). But see Perry v. PerezWendt, 294 P.3d 1081, 1087 (Haw. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that “an individual's
unsolicited and informal communication with a government official, when there is
no formal process or procedure in progress” does not constitute sufficient petitioning
activity to trigger the protection of Hawaii’s anti-SLAPP statute).
93
States in this category include: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-752 (2019)),
Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-504 (West 2019)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 8136 (West 2019)), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (West 2019)),
Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (West 2019)), Massachusetts (MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2019)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 554.02
(West 2019)), Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21,243 (West 2019)), Nevada
(NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.650 (West 2019)), New York (N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §
70-a (McKinney 2019)), Pennsylvania (27 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7707
(West 2019)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1403 (West 2019)), and Virginia (VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-223.2 (West 2019)). See also State Anti-SLAPP Laws, supra note 83.
94
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1403 (West 2018).
95
See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-752 (West 2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63504 (West 2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.295 (West 2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (West 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2019); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 554.02; NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-21,243 (West 2019); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.650 (West 2019); N.Y.
CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a (McKinney); PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302
(West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1403 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01223.2 (West 2019). See also State Anti-SLAPP Laws, supra note 83.
91
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of citizens to petition the government and speak freely about
issues under consideration by the government while still
protecting individuals’ rights to seek damages for defamatory
statements. 96 For example, in Blanchard, a hospital president’s
statement to the media related to an ongoing Department of
Mental
Health
investigation
was
protected. 97
The final category of statutes, Broad Anti-SLAPP
Protections, are the least restrictive. Broad Protections protect
any speech that is made in any forum in connection with any
issue of public interest. 98 California’s anti-SLAPP law protects
“any act . . . in furtherance of the . . . right of petition or free
speech . . . in connection with a public issue.” 99 This statute and
others in this category protect statements made on social media,
at public gatherings, or in other public spaces even when the
comments are not under consideration by the government as
long as the comments pertain to an issue of public interest. 100
These statutes protect free speech rights of individuals while
providing opportunities for individuals to seek damages when
speech is truly defamatory. 101 For example, in Deaver, a
defendant created a website on which he wrote extensively about
plaintiff, an attorney’s, supposed racist and sexist beliefs and
their impact on his work. 102 Because the public had an interest in
96

What is a SLAPP?, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://anti-slapp.org/what-is-aslapp (last visited May 7, 2019).
97
Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 75 N.E.3d 21, 31–32 (Mass. 2017). But
see id. at 32–33 (noting that the same administrator’s emails to staff were not
protected because they specifically dealt with staffing issues rather than the
investigation itself and because, by virtue of being internal, was not made in a public
forum).
98
Jurisdictions in this category include: California (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16
(West 2019)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-196a (West 2019)), D.C.
(D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5501 (West 2019)), Illinois (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
110/15 (West 2019)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 34-7-7-1 (West 2019)), Kansas
(KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5320 (West 2019)), Louisiana (LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN.
art. 971 (2019)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 556 (2019)), Maryland (MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807 (West 2019)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
31.150 (West 2019)), Rhode Island (9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-33-2 (West 2019)),
Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.002 (West 2019)), and Vermont
(VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041 (West 2019)). See also State Anti-SLAPP Laws, supra
note 83.
99
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (2018).
100
See e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-196a (West 2019); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5501 (West 2019); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 110/15 (West 2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-7-7-1 (West 2019); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-5320 (West 2019); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (West 2019); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 556 (West 2019); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807
(West 2019); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.150 (West 2019); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 933-2 (West 2019); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.002 (West 2019); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041 (West 2019); State Anti-SLAPP Laws, supra note 83.
101
Id.
102
Deaver v. Desai, 483 S.W.3d 668, 671 (Tex. App. 2015).
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statements about an attorney’s fitness to represent clients, the
anti-SLAPP statute protected the defendant’s statements. 103
Probability of Prevailing
If a defendant successfully shows that the speech in
question is protected under a state’s anti-SLAPP statute, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a reasonable probability
of prevailing on their defamation claim. 104 Essentially, the
plaintiff must establish that “the complaint is both legally
sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of
facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted
by the plaintiff is credited.” 105 Generally, the court may look to
the pleadings and any supporting affidavits to determine whether
the plaintiff has demonstrated a reasonable probability of
prevailing. 106
Though defamation laws vary by jurisdiction, pleading a
defamation claim generally requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
a probability of prevailing on three elements: (a) the defendant
made a false or defamatory statement, (b) the statement was
published to a third party, (c) the plaintiff was damaged by
defendant’s statement, (d) the requisite mental state. 107
These elements are subject to exceptions. In some cases,
the defendant’s statement may be protected or privileged under
another statute. 108 Often, states consider police reports,
misconduct reports to an administrative agency, and similar
statements to be protected. 109 In the case of protected statements,
the plaintiff must generally demonstrate that the defendant made
the statement with malice—that they made the statement when
they had reason to doubt that it was true. 110 The malice
requirement also applies when the plaintiff is a person of public
interest, such as a celebrity or a politician. 111 If a showing of
actual malice is required, to overcome an anti-SLAPP motion

103

Id. at 677.
Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 599 (9th Cir. 2010).
105
Id.
106
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(2).
107
Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chem. Co., 364 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing the
falsity, publication, and damages elements of a defamation claim.
108
See Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 715 (5th Cir. 2016).
109
Id.; see also Ku v. Dibaji, No. A146032, 2017 WL 3205809 (Cal. Ct. App. July 28,
2017) (finding similarly that a report to a school Title IX officer was privileged); Lee
v. Whalen, No. CIV.A. 97-01277, 1998 WL 156993 (Mass. Super. Mar. 25, 1998)
(holding that a police report is privileged to the extent that it is true).
110
Cuba, 814 F.3d at 715.
111
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
104
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the plaintiff must also demonstrate a probability of prevailing on
the claim that statements were made with malice. 112
III. SEXUAL ASSAULT ALLEGATIONS AND ANTI-SLAPP
MOTIONS
At first glance, anti-SLAPP statutes seem like a promising
tool for ensuring free expression and protecting individuals who
make sexual assault allegations. However, when applied,
survivor-defendants 113 in these cases face significant challenges
on the path to having an anti-SLAPP motion granted. First, the
survivor-defendant must show that the assault allegations
themselves are the sort of speech protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute. Even if the survivor-defendant is successful in showing
that the anti-SLAPP statute applies, their motion will still fail if
the accused-plaintiff can establish a reasonable likelihood of
prevailing on their case.
Protections for Allegations Under Anti-SLAPP Statutes
In an ideal circumstance, a survivor sued for defamation
would be protected by a statute that allowed them to file an antiSLAPP motion in response to the suit. A successful anti-SLAPP
motion would shift the burden from the survivor-defendant to
the accused-plaintiff. 114 Instead of the survivor-defendant having
to demonstrate that the suit is without merit to have it dismissed,
the accused-plaintiff would have to prove that their suit had merit
in order to prevail. 115 Unfortunately, even in jurisdictions that
have anti-SLAPP statutes, survivors aren’t always protected.
Whether an anti-SLAPP statute protects allegations of
sexual assault is highly dependent on both the facts of the case
and the jurisdiction in which the speech was made. 116 The degree
of protection anti-SLAPP statutes offer survivors is largely based
on whether the statute is a formal petition protection, a political
participant protection, or a broad anti-SLAPP protection. 117
112
Vander-Plas v. May, No. 07-15-00454-CV, 2016 WL 5851913, at *5 (Tex. App.
Oct. 4, 2016).
113
Overwhelmingly, when the facts of a case involve a sexual assault, the person
accused of sexual assault is the defendant. SLAPPs flip the familiar formula on its
head, instead positioning the accused person as the plaintiff and the survivor as the
defendant. Because the arrangement of the parties in these cases is counterintuitive, I
have adopted special terms to provide greater clarity. “Accused-Plaintiff” refers to
the person accused of sexual assault who has now initiated a lawsuit for defamation.
“Survivor-Defendant” refers to the person who made an accusation of sexual assault
and is now facing a lawsuit.
114
Denison, supra note 77, at 21–22.
115
Id.
116
State Anti-SLAPP Laws, supra note 83.
117
See infra Part II.A.
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Formal Petition Protections
Anti-SLAPP statutes that protect formal petitioners limit
the speech which is protected by the statute in both forum and
subject. 118 In these jurisdictions, the statutes generally do not
protect survivors of sexual violence who choose to speak up
about abuse unless the speech is made in connection with an
official petition in some way, relating to a matter in which they
are seeking intervention or help from the government. 119 In the
seven states with restrictions on both forum and topic of
protected speech, there is a noticeable lack of case law
interpreting how speech protections may be applied, if at all, to
allegations of sexual violence. Although it is difficult to state a
definitive reason, this may be because the requirements of the
anti-SLAPP statutes are so strict that survivors sued in SLAPPs
realize the futility of attempting to apply the anti-SLAPP
statute. 120
Saldivar v. Momah, a Washington 121 Supreme Court case,
demonstrates how strictly courts interpret petitioning activity.
122
In this case, the anti-SLAPP statute protected a patient’s
reports of sexual abuse by multiple doctors to the police and the
Medical Quality Assurance Commission because they were
petitioning activity-seeking redress from the government. 123 The
118
States in this category include: Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634F-1 (West
2019)), Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.528 (West 2019)), New Mexico (N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1 (West 2019)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1443.1
(West 2019)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-1003 (West 2019)), and
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.510 (West 2019)). See also State AntiSLAPP Laws, supra note 83.
119
See e.g., Saldivar v. Momah, 186 P.3d 1117, 1123 (2008), superseded by statute, WA.
REV. CODE. § 4.24.525(1)(a) (2010), as recognized in Bevan v. Meyers, 183 Wash.
App. 177, 185 (2014); Milionis v. Newport Sch. Dist., No. 56-415, 2009 WL
3133152, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2009) (2009); Mantell v. P & J.V. Mgmt.
Corp., No. PLCV201200536, 2013 WL 6175642, at *6 (Mass. Super. Sept. 22, 2013).
120
See e.g., Bruce Johnson & Antoinette Bonsignore, Protect #MeToo Victims from
Retaliatory Lawsuits, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018)
https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/protect-metoo-victims-from-retaliatorylawsuits/ (describing the futility of applying Washington’s anti-SLAPP law to most
cases raised in the context of #MeToo).
121
In Davis v. Cox, the Washington Supreme Court held that a newer anti-SLAPP
statute, RCW 4.24.525, was unconstitutional on its face because it required plaintiff
to meet a “clear and convincing” standard in demonstrating their prima facie claim,
thus interfering with the right to jury trial. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525 (2010);
Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862, 864 (2015). Saldivar v. Momah was decided under RCW
4.24.510, which does not employ the clear and convincing standard and which is the
anti-SLAPP law currently used in Washington. See generally WASH. REV. CODE. §
4.24.510 (West 2019). See also Saldivar, 186 P.3d. at 1117.
122
Interestingly, in Saldivar the trial court’s finding that the patient was not a credible
witness was not alone sufficient to support the claims brought against her. See
Saldivar, 186 P.3d. at 1129.
123
Id. (citing Reid v. Dalton, 100 P.3d at 356 (2004) (noting in particular that
litigation that does not bring a bona fide complaint does not receive protection under
the anti-SLAPP statute)).
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statute, however, did not protect the claims made in the patient’s
civil suit, because “[a] plaintiff who brings a private lawsuit for
private relief is not seeking official governmental action, but
rather redress from the court.” 124 However, another case
indicates that complaints to administrative bodies regarding
sexually abusive behavior constitute petitioning the government
for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. 125
In effect, these laws protect allegations of sexual violence
only when they are made to a law enforcement or administrative
body with the purpose of seeking intervention. 126 In most cases,
laws that limit anti-SLAPP protections to petitioning activity are
unlikely to sufficiently protect individuals who speak out about
sexual violence. Given that the majority of survivors do not
make a formal report, 127 statements about abusers often cannot
be tied to a petition of the government. For that reason, laws that
fall into this category are unlikely to establish sufficient
protections for an individual speaking publicly about sexual
violence.
Political Participant Protections
Anti-SLAPP statutes that shield political participants
protect speech made in any forum but require the speech to be
related to a matter in which there is a petition for government
redress. 128 In these jurisdictions, individuals have significantly
more flexibility in where and how they discuss allegations of
sexual violence; however, the requirement that their speech is
related to ongoing government action remains. 129 Courts
applying these statutes generally take a broader view of what
124
Id. But see Mantell v. P & J.V. Mgmt. Corp., No. PLCV201200536, 2013 WL
6175642, at *6 (Mass. Super. Sept. 22, 2013) (holding that a complaint to an
employment investigatory body and a suit filed after that complaint are protected
petitioning activity).
125
Milionis v. Newport Sch. Dist., No. 56-415, 2009 WL 3133152, at *4 (Wash. Ct.
App. Oct. 1, 2009) (2009) (holding that a defendant’s report of a teacher’s past
sexually abusive behavior to the school administration was sufficient to constitute a
petition seeking official government action).
126
Id.; Saldivar, 186 P.3d. at 1129.
127
PLANTY ET AL., supra note 31, at 6–7.
128
States in this category include: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-752 (2019)),
Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-504 (West 2019)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 8136 (West 2019)), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (West 2019)),
Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (West 2019)), Massachusetts (MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2019)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 554.02
(West 2019)), Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21,243 (West 2019)), Nevada
(NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.650 (West 2019)), New York (N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §
70-a (McKinney 2019)), Pennsylvania (27 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §
7707(West 2019)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1403 (West 2019)), and Virginia
(VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-223.2 (West 2019)). See also State Anti-SLAPP Laws, supra
note 83.
129
Id.
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constitutes petitioning activity than courts have when
interpreting anti-SLAPP statutes that are only protections for
petitioners. 130 Generally, filing a civil lawsuit or an
administrative complaint is sufficient to establish petitioning
activity for purposes of statutes that protect political
participants. 131
For example, in Rogers v. Dupree, a Georgia case, a
housekeeper experiencing sexual harassment by her employer
recorded a video of a sexual encounter with him. 132 The
housekeeper’s attorneys used this video along with a demand
letter to try to negotiate a settlement with the employer before
filing an official complaint. 133 Soon after, the employer who had
been accused of sexual harassment filed suit against the
housekeeper’s attorneys. The lawsuit solely dealt with the
demand letter and communications taking place before the
attorneys filed suit. 134 The attorneys’ attempt to use the antiSLAPP statute to have the suit dismissed was unsuccessful
because their actions before the claim was filed were not
connected to petitioning activity or an issue under consideration
by a government body at the time. 135
This category of laws is similar in effect to laws that limit
protection both by forum and type of speech in that they require
an allegation of sexual violence to be made to some government
or administrative body. Even though these statutes tend to
interpret what qualifies as petitioning activity more broadly, they
do not address the major problem of the laws which limit
protection by forum and topic, that many survivors do not make
a formal report. 136 Laws which fall into this category offer
increased protections to survivors speaking up about sexual
violence, but they are still unlikely to protect survivors in most
cases.
Broad Anti-SLAPP Protections
Broad anti-SLAPP statutes do not limit the speech
protected by the statute by either forum or subject. 137 In these
130

See, e.g., Mantell v. P & J.V. Mgmt. Corp., No. PLCV201200536, 2013 WL
6175642, at *6 (Mass. Super. Sept. 22, 2013).
131
See, e.g., id. (holding that an administrative complaint filed with the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination was petitioning activity protected under the
statute.).
132
Rogers v. Dupree, 799 S.E.2d 1, 4 (Va. 2017).
133
Id. at 6.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 5.
136
PLANTY ET AL, supra note 31.
137
Jurisdictions in this category include: California (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16
(West 2019)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-196a (West 2019)), D.C.
(D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5501 (West 2019)), Illinois (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
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jurisdictions, anti-SLAPP statutes protect any statement made in
any forum on any topic of public interest. 138 In litigation, whether
statutes in this category protect a sexual assault allegation often
depends on whether or not it is of public interest. 139 Generally,
allegations which relate to ongoing petitioning activity or which
are against a public figure will always be a topic of public
interest. 140 When made against a person not in the public eye, an
allegation of sexual assault may still be a matter of public interest
if it is connected to some larger conversation or controversy. 141
When the issue concerns systemic abuse or others at future risk
for abuse, the speech is more likely to be of interest to the
public. 142
In Steep Hill Laboratories v. Moore, a accused-plaintiff’s
allegation that her employer, who was not a public figure, had
sexually harassed her was determined to not be of public interest
because it only involved the survivor, the accused person, and
others within the office. 143 On the other hand, in a case where
the survivor-defendant made allegations that Conroy, a
politician running for office, had sexually abused former
employees, the allegations were deemed to be of public
interest. 144 Conroy was a public figure, and thus the public had
an interest in weighing this information to determine his fitness
110/15 (West 2019)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 34-7-7-1 (West 2019)), Kansas
(KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5320 (West 2019)), Louisiana (LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN.
art. 971 (2019)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 556 (2019)), Maryland (MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807 (West 2019)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
31.150 (West 2019)), Rhode Island (9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-33-2 (West 2019)),
Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.002 (West 2019)), and Vermont
(VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041 (West 2019)). See also State Anti-SLAPP Laws, supra
note 83.
138
Id.
139
Olaes v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 474 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that while the eradication of workplace sexual harassment constitutes an
issue of public interest, and individual report of workplace harassment does not
invoke that interest).
140
See Schwern v. Plunkett, 845 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2017) (accepting both
parties’ stipulation that a wife’s comment on her husband’s rape arrest was
connected to an issue of public interest); Conroy v. Spitzer, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 446
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
141
Steep Hill Labs., Inc. v. Moore, No. 18-CV-00373-LB, 2018 WL 1242182, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2018); Eli Rosenberg & Christine Phillips, Accused of Rape, Former
Baylor Fraternity President Gets No Jail Time After Plea Deal, WASH. POST (Dec. 11,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2018/12/11/accused-rapeformer-frat-president-gets-no-jail-time-after-plea-dealda/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8f9ba9be6795 (demonstrating how an isolated
allegation can garner public interest if connected to a larger controversy, such as
lenient sentencing of campus rapists or the Baylor rape scandal.).
142
See Brenner v. Hill, No. A149758, 2017 WL 5589175 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21,
2017) (holding that allegations of systemic issues of sexual violence or harassment
impacting a community or industry at large are issues of public interest).
143
Steep Hill, 2018 WL 1242182, at *7. But see Olaes, 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 474.
144
See Conroy v. Spitzer, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 443, 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
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for office. 145 In Brenner v. Hill, allegations of industry
professionals’ sexual abuse of models contained in a “blacklist”
distributed among the modeling community were of public
interest because they tied into a larger conversation about how
workplace sexual violence impacted women in the modeling
industry. 146
This category of laws provides the most expansive
protections for individuals making complaints of sexual
violence. An individual’s speech is not required to be related to
petitioning activity or to be made in a particular forum. 147 As a
result, informal allegations and conversations may be
protected. 148 However, the requirement of proving that the
allegations are of public interest still means that an allegation
made in isolation, without clear public purpose, often does not
trigger the law’s protection. 149 Even when survivor-defendants
can establish that their allegations are protected by the statute,
accused-plaintiffs may still defeat the motion by demonstrating a
likelihood that they will prevail on a case of defamation. 150
Likelihood of Prevailing on a Defamation Claim against Allegations
of Sexual Violence
When a court finds that a sexual assault allegation is
protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, the burden shifts to the
accused-plaintiff to establish a reasonable probability of
prevailing on their defamation case. 151 To prevail, the accusedplaintiff must technically do more than establish a prima facie
case. Still, the bar for prevailing is quite low. 152 In determining
the strength of the accused-plaintiff’s case, the court will consider
only the complaint and facts alleged in signed affidavits. 153
Because anti-SLAPP motions are filed at the motion to dismiss
stage, the court must interpret all facts in the light most favorable
to the accused-plaintiff. 154 The court generally will not “weigh
evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.” 155 In most cases,
as long as the accused-plaintiff successfully pleads all elements of
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a defamation claim and claims facts supporting these elements,
they will have established a sufficient probability of prevailing. 156
False Statement
The accused-plaintiff must establish that the survivordefendant has made a false statement. 157 Who has the burden of
demonstrating truth or falsehood varies widely based on
jurisdiction, whether the parties are public figures, and whether
the issue is one of public interest. The theory behind having
standards that differ by scenario is that the less public the parties
and the topic of the speech, the less value the speech has. 158
Lower value speech can be regulated more significantly with less
concerns that those regulations might violate the First
Amendment. 159 More public speech, however, has higher value
under the First Amendment, and is generally provided higher
protections from interference. 160
In scenarios where both the plaintiff and the defendant
are private figures and the information shared is not of public
interest, states may apply common law standards and
presumptions. 161 The common law standard places no burden on
plaintiffs to demonstrate that the statements are false and assume
falsity instead. 162 Defendants can overcome this presumption by
proving falsity as a defense. 163 On the other hand, in some
scenarios, the burden of demonstrating that the statement is false
falls to the plaintiff. 164 When the plaintiff is a public figure, they
carry the burden of proving that statements are false. 165 When the
claims are about private figures but are of public interest, the
plaintiff also must demonstrate that the statement is false. 166
For the purposes of defeating an anti-SLAPP motion
related to claims of sexual violence, the accused-plaintiff’s
unequivocal denial of the allegation is typically sufficient to
establish that the statement is false. 167 For example, in Heineke, a
federal district court applying California’s anti-SLAPP statute, a
professor was accused of having sexually harassed a student. 168
156
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The professor’s complaint alleging that the survivor-defendant’s
sexual assault accusations were false combined with his wife’s
affidavit supporting that claim were enough to establish his
likelihood of prevailing on the claim. 169 However, failure to
completely deny the truth of the allegations or failure to deny the
allegations at all can be fatal to the accused-plaintiff’s attempt to
establish that they have a probability of prevailing. 170 In Spelling,
the accused-plaintiff filed a defamation claim after being accused
of sexually harassing his home health aide. 171 Sessions, the
woman who had accused Spelling, filed an anti-SLAPP motion
in response to his defamation claim. Spelling failed to establish a
probability of prevailing on the claim because he did not state
that the harassment had not occurred, but rather, that he could
not recall whether it had. 172
Publication
For the purposes of showing the probability of prevailing
against an anti-SLAPP motion, the accused-plaintiff must only
allege that the survivor-defendant made their statement to
someone else and identified the accused-plaintiff. 173 If the
survivor-defendant makes an allegation or multiple allegations of
sexual violence without actually identifying the accused-plaintiff
by name, the accused-plaintiff can still satisfy the publication
element by meeting a low bar. 174 The accused-plaintiff must
show that, taken as a whole, the survivor-defendant’s statements
are likely to identify him. 175 In Bayhi, the accused-plaintiff, a
priest, had been accused of having knowledge of the sexual abuse
of a child and failing to report it. 176 A news program reported on
the story and incorrectly included a graphic stating that the
accused-plaintiff was a priest. 177 In a voiceover paired with the
graphic, the program correctly stated that Friar Bayhi was only
accused of failing to report the abuse. 178 Despite the conflicts
between the two statements, taken as a whole, the broadcast was
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deemed to be sufficient to have potentially identified Friar Bayhi
as the abuser. 179
Damage
Generally, in order to prove a probability of prevailing on
a defamation claim, the accused-plaintiff must show that the
statement in question had a damaging impact. 180 In most
jurisdictions, allegations that an individual has committed a
serious or violent crime constitute per se defamation; 181 when this
kind of crime is falsely alleged, it is presumed to be damaging to
an accused-plaintiff’s reputation. 182 Allegations of sexual
violence are generally considered defamatory per se, so the
accused-plaintiff does not need to show any other damages to
defeat an anti-SLAPP motion. 183 In Miranda, Miranda accused
the plaintiff, Byles, of sexually abusing his granddaughter. 184
Because Miranda’s statements constituted defamation per se,
Byles was not required to demonstrate that the statements had
been damaging. 185
Fault
Finally, in order to prevail on a defamation claim, the
accused-plaintiff must show that the survivor-defendant had a
particular mental state. Generally, he accused-plaintiff must
show that the speaker spoke negligently, or without regard for
the truth or falsehood of the statement. 186 An accused-plaintiff’s
claim that the survivor-defendant knew or ought to have known
that the allegations of sexual assault were not true is enough to
satisfy this element for purposes of defeating an anti-SLAPP
motion.187 For example, in Heineke, a student accused a professor
of sexually harassing her. Heineke, the professor, claimed that
the student knowingly made a false accusation. This was enough
to demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on this element for the
purposes of surviving the anti-SLAPP motion.188
In some special cases, the accused-plaintiff must reach a
higher burden to establish the mental state needed for a
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defamation claim. 189 When these cases are implicated in an antiSLAPP motion, the accused-plaintiff must also show a
likelihood of prevailing on an additional element or burden in
order to show a likelihood of prevailing in their case. 190 The most
common additional burden accused-plaintiffs must overcome is
demonstrating that the defendant acted in malice. The malice
requirement is not, as it sounds, a requirement that the speaker
act in bad faith. 191 Instead, it simply requires that the speaker had
reason to seriously doubt the truth of the statements they made
and, nevertheless, they made those statements anyway. 192
Though jurisdictions vary, the requirement for malice is
generally triggered when the accused-plaintiff is a person of
public interest (such as a celebrity or politician) or the survivordefendant was exercising a right that is otherwise privileged
under the law (like filing a police report or making a complaint
to human resources). 193
Unlike asserting that the survivor-defendant’s allegations
are false, simply asserting that the survivor-defendant acted with
malice is generally not sufficient to establish a probability of
prevailing. 194 The accused-plaintiff must generally provide
support or corroboration for the claim that the allegation was
made with malice. 195 For example, in Vander-Plas, the plaintiff,
May, was a politician accused of sexual assault and
harassment. 196 Because May was a public figure, he was required
to show that Vander-Plas’s claim of sexual violence had been
made with malice. 197 His statement in his complaint that he
believed her claims to be made with malice was not sufficient to
establish a probability of prevailing. 198 However, in Picozzi, an
plaintiff was accused of sexual harassment in a privileged report
made to an employer. 199 The accused-plaintiff established a
probability of prevailing on the element of actual malice by
189

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
It is important to note that “malice,” as it is used in this area of the law, does not
simply mean that the speaker acted with ill will. In order to have acted with malice,
the speaker must have entertained serious doubts about the truth of their statement
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2016).
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demonstrating that the survivor-defendant’s story of assault
contained several inconsistencies and that she had a motive for
filing a false report. 200
IV. APPLICABILITY OF ANTI-SLAPP IN THE AGE OF
“ME TOO”
In theory, anti-SLAPP statutes bolster the promise of the
First Amendment. In practice, their promise to survivors of
sexual assault seems somewhat empty. Although anti-SLAPP
statutes might offer some protection for survivors alleging assault
in certain circumstances, on the whole, anti-SLAPP law seems
unlikely to protect the free speech rights of survivors. However,
shifting social norms in the “Me Too” era may also shift legal
interpretations of these statutes, making them more accessible to
survivors who seek their protection.
Limitations of Anti-SLAPP Protections
The above survey of the law indicates that the protections
anti-SLAPP motions offer “Me Too” survivors are unfortunately
quite limited in most jurisdictions. 201 Of the jurisdictions that
have anti-SLAPP statutes, nineteen require that speech be
connected to formal petitioning activity. 202 The complaints of the
“Me Too” era are largely made informally via social media and
technology and are not connected to any government
petitioning. 203 As a result, in the current landscape, most
survivor-defendants would not even be able to use an antiSLAPP statute to successfully shift the burden of establishing a
viable case to the accused-plaintiff.
That said, even when survivor-defendants are able to
successfully shift the burden to the accused-plaintiff, the accused200
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See infra Part III.
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Jurisdictions in this category include: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-752
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§ 59H (West 2019)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 554.02 (West 2019)), Missouri
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plaintiff can easily establish a probability of prevailing in their
case by effectively pleading all of the allegations of a defamation
claim. 204 Even if an accused-plaintiff is responsible for the sexual
violence alleged by the survivor-defendant, they can successfully
defeat an anti-SLAPP motion by saying that the allegation is not
true. 205 Although a survivor-defendant may ultimately present
evidence to prove the truth of their claim at summary judgment
or trial, they are not protected from the costs, both emotional and
financial, of litigation or choosing to settle the case, and the
SLAPP has still achieved its harassing purpose. 206
The exception to this rule in cases of informal survivor
speech, however, is cases like Kristen’s in which the plaintiff is a
public figure. 207 Though this is likely not the general case, it does
have important implications in the “Me Too” era, where many
allegations have been against well-known artists, politicians, and
other public figures. 208 In these cases, the accused-plaintiff is
required to make a showing that the speaker acted with malice. 209
This standard is more difficult to meet than the standard that
generally required establishing a likelihood of prevailing on a
defamation claim. 210 The heightened requirement could provide
greater protections for survivors who make allegations against
public figures.
Finally, even when a survivor-defendant successfully uses
an anti-SLAPP motion to have a case dismissed, they are not
entirely protected from the impacts of litigation. Several states
offer the accused-plaintiff an opportunity to overcome what
would otherwise be a successful anti-SLAPP motion by
amending their complaint, either while the motion is pending or
after it is granted. Even when accused-plaintiffs cannot amend or
re-file a complaint, they often may appeal the decision to grant
the anti-SLAPP motion. 211 Even in the best-case scenario, where
204
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a survivor-defendant’s motion is successful and survives both the
amendment of the complaint and an appeal, they still face the
financial and emotional costs of litigation until the motion to
dismiss stage. 212 Median estimates for costs of defending against
general civil litigation in the initial stage range from about $2,000
(for an automobile case) 213 to $9,000 (for a contract case). 214
Because defending against a SLAPP requires specialized legal
knowledge, the initial fees in these cases are likely even higher. 215
Many anti-SLAPP statutes account for this by requiring a grant
of costs and fees to successful anti-SLAPP defendants; however,
a few do not. 216 Even so, no anti-SLAPP statute contains a
(West 2019); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.150 (West 2019). In California, the plaintiff
may amend and refile after grant if the California statute is being applied in a federal
case. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2019). In California (CAL. CIV. PROC.
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ANN. § 27.002 (West 2019)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1403 (West 2019)),
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note 83.
212
Denison, supra note 77, at 21–22.
213
HANNAFORD-AGOR & WATERS, supra note 57, at 7.
214
Id.
215
Denison, supra note 77, at 21–22.
216
Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-752 (2019)), Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. §
16-63-504 (West 2019)), California (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2019)),
Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-196a (West 2019)), D.C. (D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-5501 (West 2019)), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (West 2019)),
Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (West 2019)), Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 634F-1 (West 2019)), Illinois (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/15 (West 2019)),
Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 34-7-7-1 (West 2019)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 605320 (West 2019)), Louisiana (LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2019)),
Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2019)), Minnesota
(MINN. STAT. ANN. § 554.02 (West 2019)), Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.528
(West 2019)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.650 (West 2019)), New Mexico
(N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1 (West 2019)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.150
(West 2019)), Pennsylvania (27 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7707 (West
2019)), Rhode Island (9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-33-2 (West 2019)), Tennessee
(TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-1003 (West 2019)), Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 27.002 (West 2019)), and Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041 (West
2019)), Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-223.2 (West 2019)), and Washington
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provision sufficient to repair the emotional trauma survivors face
when being unfairly sued by an abuser for speaking out. 217
Shifting Norms and the “Me Too” Movement
In the age of “Me Too,” social norms and attitudes about
sexual violence and those who choose to speak up about it have
shifted dramatically. Whether those impacts will seep into
interpretation of anti-SLAPP law remains to be seen. In this
context, it is possible that the impact of the “Me Too” movement
will lead courts to reinterpret both what constitutes petitioning
activity and what is an issue of public interest more broadly when
considering SLAPP suits involving sexual violence.
Petitioning Activity
The power of “Me Too” has encouraged activists,
advocates, and survivors to leverage their own experiences to
demand change. 218 As a result, survivors have begun telling their
stories to demand better treatment from the government and,
more specifically from the legal system. 219 With this in mind, it
is possible that the context of survivors’ statements may impact
whether they are interpreted as petitioning activity.
For example, during recent congressional hearings, then
Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh stood accused of
multiple sexual assaults. 220 Survivors used the power of their
stories to fight the nomination. 221 Hundreds of survivors and
activists descended on the Senate before the confirmation vote,
sharing stories and encouragements among one another. 222
Phoebe Suva, a woman from Maine, bravely stood in Senator
Susan Collins’ office and shared her own experience of sexual
assault to encourage the Senator to vote against Kavanaugh’s
confirmation. 223 Phoebe was not petitioning the government for
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a response to her experience of sexual violence. However, she
was petitioning the government for a response to sexual violence
broadly, and she was speaking about her own experience to do
so. 224 Perhaps for purposes of anti-SLAPP law, Phoebe and the
hundreds of other activists who shared their stories in the senate
building would be considered petitioners or connected to
petitioning activity.
In other cases, what counts as petitioning activity for the
purpose of anti-SLAPP law may be even blurrier. During the
same hearing and confirmation process, survivors took to
Twitter and other social media to share their own stories, both to
persuade politicians and to commiserate with others impacted by
the hearings. 225 Whether survivors sharing their own experiences
of sexual assault in this way would count as petitioning or being
connected to an issue before a government body is uncertain.
Increasing discussion about sexual violence and
survivors’ experiences in the context of demanding change may
ultimately have the impact of shifting how petitioning and
petitioning activity is seen in SLAPP suits that involve sexual
violence. Perhaps even in states which limit anti-SLAPP laws to
protections for petitioners and protections for political
participants, survivors who speak will begin to benefit from
broader approaches.
Public Interest
Due to the “Me Too” movement, conversations about sexual
violence seem to be of public interest now more than ever
before. 226 In this context, it is possible that what might have been
considered an isolated allegation in the past might instead be
interpreted as contributing to a larger conversation. 227 If this is
true, one survivor’s speech about their own experience may be
sufficiently related to a topic of public interest to trigger an antiSLAPP statute’s protections. 228
It is uncertain whether the speaker would have to
explicitly state their intent to be a part of the larger conversation
or whether any sexual assault allegation would automatically be
considered part of this ongoing conversation. A potential shift is
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/us/politics/collinsmurkowski-kavanaugh.html.
224
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225
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that allegations of sexual assault, given their recent social impact
and importance, might be considered to be of per se public
interest. Even if the statements are not considered public interest
per se, survivors may find that it is easier now than ever to connect
their own experience to a larger issue of public interest. It is
possible that a speaker could come under an anti-SLAPP
statute’s protection simply by saying or hash-tagging “Me Too,”
in conjunction with their statement.
One recent case, T.S. Media, sparks particular hope that
courts may begin to consider sexual assault allegations broadly
to be of public interest. 229 In this case, talk show host Tavis
Smiley sued the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) for their
public statement in response to multiple reports that Smiley
sexually harassed colleagues. 230 PBS responded with an antiSLAPP motion. The court held that because Smiley was a public
figure, the allegations were of public interest. 231 More
importantly, the court went on to explain that PBS’s comments
were related to an issue of public interest specifically because
they were made during the height of the “Me Too” movement
and that public interest in allegations of sexual harassment was
especially high. 232
V. A WAY FORWARD
Because bringing to light accusations of sexual violence
generally serves a public good, and because survivors face
significant barriers in coming forward, there is a public interest
in protecting their First Amendment right to this speech. 233 The
question is how best to achieve this goal. Solutions include
improving existing anti-SLAPP laws or creating additional antiSLAPP statutes.
Improving Existing Anti-SLAPP law
Survivor speech could be offered better First Amendment
protections by making minor, specific changes to existing antiSLAPP laws. These recommendations must be weighed against
229
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countervailing concerns, specifically that a relaxation of
standards might make individuals falsely accused of sexual
violence vulnerable to an unfair dismissal of a defamation
claim. 234 However, a thoughtful implementation of measured
protections for speech about sexual violence could balance free
speech and false speech concerns. Such protections might
include an exemption from any requirement that the statement
be made in the context of petitioning activity; a presumption that
the speech is on a subject in which there is public interest; and a
requirement that the plaintiff must establish a likelihood of
prevailing on the element of actual malice in all sexual violence
cases.
Exemption from Requirements of Petitioning Activity
Anti-SLAPP laws in jurisdictions with petitioning
requirements should explicitly exempt individuals speaking out
with allegations of sexual violence from any requirement of
government petition. This exemption is warranted because
sexual violence has historically been underreported through
traditional methods such as police reporting. 235 Survivors face
many barriers, including a lack of knowledge, a lack of resources,
or a lack of accessible reporting mechanisms. 236 These barriers
are particularly high in communities in which people are already
disenfranchised, including communities of color, immigrant
communities, and LGBTQIA237 communities, among others. 238
Survivors often do not turn to the justice system because they
know the futility of doing so.239 Given that underreporting is
largely a problem produced by the system, it is unfair for
survivors to be punished for resorting to alternative, non-violent
means of justice (such as speech.) This would ensure that
survivors who chose to seek justice or accountability by speaking
234
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about their experiences in other forums would not be exposed to
unfair liability.
Presumption of Public Interest
The success of an anti-SLAPP claim may often hinge on
whether a survivor-defendant’s claims are of public interest.
Every jurisdiction requires a showing that statements are of
public-interest in order to benefit from the protection of antiSLAPP laws. 240 Additionally, many jurisdictions continue to
presume the falsity of defamatory statements in cases that don’t
involve any public figure or public interest, making it
significantly easier for accused-plaintiffs to prevail. 241 Presuming
that allegations of sexual assault would help survivor-defendants
overcome these barriers.
The “Me Too” movement has provided a framework that
demonstrates the overall social impact of allegations of sexual
violence. In the context of this movement, even when survivors
have spoken up about an experience of sexual violence with a
perpetrator who is not explicitly named or especially well
known, the public has reacted with a high level of interest and
concern. 242 Because of the general interest society has routinely
expressed in statements about incidents of sexual violence, these
statements should be presumed to be of public interest. 243
Furthermore, speech about sexual violence itself has
broad social and public impacts. Perhaps most importantly, this
speech has important public safety implications. 244 For example,
an allegation of sexually harassing behavior by one individual in
an organization may impact how the public chooses to engage
240
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not only with that person, but also that organization. 245 This kind
of allegation might impact where community members travel,
learn, conduct business, and invest their money. With this in
mind, the public has an important reason to want access to this
information.
If a presumption like this were enforced, the rule could
allow the plaintiff to rebut the presumption in cases where he or
she could demonstrate that the only interests impacted are truly
private. Shifting this burden to the accused-plaintiff would
protect his or her ability to bring a valid suit while also requiring
him or her to show that the allegations were definitively not of
public interest at an earlier stage. This would ensure that
survivor-defendants are less likely to face harassing litigation for
speaking about a topic in which the public has expressed a
legitimate interest.
Requirement of Demonstration of Actual Malice
A final recommendation may require anti-SLAPP law to
establish a change in how defamation law itself is applied in cases
of sexual violence. Typically, to demonstrate a probability of
prevailing on a case of defamation, accused-plaintiffs are only
required to make a showing of actual malice if the survivordefendant’s statement is privileged (like a police report) or if the
accused-plaintiff is a person of public interest. 246 In defamation
suits in which a survivor is the defendant, the same actual malice
standard should also be applied.
Requiring a showing of the probability to prevail on an
actual malice standard in is warranted because this standard has
been applied previously in cases where speech was deemed to be
of high value. 247 Conversations about sexual violence are not
only high value speech, they are particularly vulnerable to being
suppressed. 248 With that in mind, a heightened standard for
punishing survivor-defendants who speak out is warranted.
Applying the actual malice standard to these cases as a general
rule would protect survivor-defendants’ First Amendment rights
while still allowing any accused-plaintiff who is falsely accused
an opportunity to bring a successful claim by meeting this
additional element.
245
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Creating Additional Anti-SLAPP Statutes
Currently, nineteen states do not have any anti-SLAPP
statute. 249 No federal anti-SLAPP statute exists, and in diversity
cases applying state law in federal court, the application of the
state’s anti-SLAPP statute is not guaranteed. 250 This lack of
existing statutes means that, in many parts of the country,
survivors who choose to speak up about their experiences of
sexual violence cannot access even the minimal protections antiSLAPP statutes provide. To provide increased protection for
survivors, legislators and advocates should push for increased
legislation. In particular, a federal statute would guarantee
survivor-defendants facing defamation claims in federal court the
protection of an anti-SLAPP statute. A call for such a statute
would not come completely out of left field; in 2015, Congress
considered the bi-partisan SPEAK FREE Act, an anti-SLAPP
statute that garnered wide support among public interest groups
and legislators from all parties. 251 Though the bill was not
brought to a vote when originally introduced, the moment may
be ripe for a re-introduction. A federal anti-SLAPP statute could
draw supporters from all political camps in the name of
protecting one of American citizens’ most valuable rights: free
speech. 252
CONCLUSION
Despite her harrowing experience with a SLAPP, Kristen
Vander-Plas finished law school, passed the bar exam, and
practices law in Texas. But SLAPP suits continue to threaten
survivors who speak up about violence, and most are not so
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fortunate. Jessica Corbett, who spoke up about her experience of
being abused by a White House staff member, was recently sued
by her abuser for $4 million dollars. 253 The suit is still pending,
but Jessica already reports a list of devastating impacts including
the loss of her car, her ability to be employed, and her
relationship with her fiancé. 254 Her legal costs have begun to
overwhelm her, and she has been told they may rise into six
figures. She was sued in Massachusetts, a state with an antiSLAPP statute that may not provide her protection. 255
Discussing her experience of being SLAPP-ed, she says, “My life
has been destroyed. I have sacrificed more than I ever
imagined.” 256 She sums up the threat of SLAPPs in only a few
words: “This is why abuse victims stay silent.” 257
In the age of “Me Too,” unprecedented numbers of
survivors are changing the conversation about sexual violence by
speaking up. Still, SLAPP lawsuits silence many. Survivors’
speech may be chilled by fear of being SLAPP-ed with
defamation suits by those they have accused of abuse. Because
this speech serves such an important protective and deterrent role
in preventing sexual violence, protecting it is essential.
Some anti-SLAPP statutes may provide avenues for
protecting survivor speech; however, most jurisdictions currently
lack anti-SLAPP statutes or have statutes that employ strict
standards that they are largely unhelpful to survivors. Moving
forward, an increase in anti-SLAPP statutes and changes in
existing statutes to make them more applicable to survivor
speech will ensure that victims and survivors of sexual violence
are able to fully exercise their First Amendment rights to speak
up about their experiences. Furthermore, advocates and
legislators should consider options outside of the anti-SLAPP
space, including educating victims and survivors about their
speech rights, advocating for a more accessible petitioning
system, and working towards the end of sexual violence.
Combined with thoughtful legislation and application of antiSLAPP statutes, these efforts will ensure that defamation law is
not another SLAPP in the face to vulnerable individuals seeking
to exercise their First Amendment rights.
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